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We investigate the governance of a team in which workers care to different degrees
about the team product. We show that if there are complementarities in production
and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions
that the manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts may have destructive
effects: they can distort the way workers perceive their fellow workers and they
may also lead to a reduction of effort by those workers that care most about output.
Moreover, interventions may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational
culture in which workers trust each other. Thus, our framework provides some first
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1 Introduction
What is the smallest unit in an organization? Following the philosophy of Taylor’s sci-
entific management, Ford and many other industrialists in the early twentieth century
studied and dissected work processes. They assigned elementary tasks to individual work-
ers and designed elaborate systems to manage individuals through time studies, conveyor
belts and intensive monitoring by supervisors, and they incentivized them through piece-
rate compensation. The Taylorist view of how organizations operate or should operate
seems outdated for most modern production processes. The classical case of Taylorist pro-
duction, car-building, started to move from conveyor belts to team-based structures in the
early 1970s; the Volvo plant in Kalmar became one of the showcases of team production
(see for instance Ellegard, 1996). Complex production processes, frequent innovation, and
concerns for quality have made it increasingly difficult to measure precisely what an indi-
vidual contributes to the output of an organization. Moreover, even if such measurement
were feasible, standardization and specialization have their costs: industrial psychologists
have shown that excessively narrow tasks lead to fatigue and de-motivation (Hancock and
Desmond, 2001). Hence, in many circumstances, work teams have replaced the individual
as the essential unit in organizational design.
Recognizing the importance of teams is, however, not necessarily tantamount to leav-
ing teams to their own devices. The management of an organization may decide to give a
work team different degrees of autonomy. The costs and benefits of intervening in teams
are of great interest for the management and industrial psychology literature (as the sur-
vey of 93 studies by Stewart, 2006, shows). In economics the topic has received much less
attention.
We here suggest a simple incentive theoretical framework to investigate some of the
determinants of what we call team governance: What induces an organization to empower
teams to manage themselves, or, conversely, when does an organization decide to subject
teams to some hierarchical control?
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We investigate a multi-agent situation in which workers care to different degrees about
the results of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and
if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the
manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts may have destructive effects: they
can distort the way workers perceive their fellow workers and they may also lead to a
reduction of effort by those workers that care most about output. Moreover, interventions
may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational culture in which workers trust
each other’s commitment. Thus, our framework provides some first insights into the costs
and benefits of interventions in teams. It identifies that team governance depends on how
important non-measurable tasks are. The more important these tasks, the more likely it
is that teams are empowered, that is, unfettered by managerial interventions.
Our model looks at a production process with several tasks—some of which are easier
to monitor than others. Team members can differ in their commitment to the mission
of the team: some may care more about the outcome of their work then others —in
the sense of Besley and Ghatak’s (2005) “motivated agents” who “pursue goals because
they perceive intrinsic benefits from doing so”. Those who do care would be willing to
exert effort in order to achieve quality. However, because of the complementarity between
workers’ efforts, it is only optimal for them to do so, if they expect the other team members
to do the same. The manager responsible for a team may have some pieces of information
about the commitment of some or all of the team members, for instance, from a worker’s
personnel file that team members have no access to. This information need not be better
than that of the team members; an informed principal problem in the sense of Maskin and
Tirole (1992) emerges whenever the manager has some private information. The manager
can choose whether to intervene or to empower.
The main purpose of the model is to investigate the determinants of empowerment
vs. hierarchical control and to identify the consequences of managerial interventions in
teams. Consider a team that consists of two members, A and B. If all tasks can be
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perfectly monitored, managerial intervention is (trivially) good for the productivity of
the team. However, if some of the tasks are too complex to be monitored, there are
costs associated with the intervention. We first assume that everybody knows that A
is committed to the team goals, while B’s commitment is only known to the manager.
To simplify, the manager’s information is perfect and efforts of A and B are sequentially
chosen. In this simple setting, managerial interventions signal to team member A that
the manager believes B not to be committed. Team member A then updates his belief
about the probability that B will put effort into the task that cannot be monitored. As
a result, A does not exert effort even though he is committed. The reason is that under
complementarity, such effort would be wasted unless team member B also exerts effort.
Intervention thus has two effects: it increases effort at tasks that can be monitored
easily and lowers effort at tasks that cannot be monitored. This trade-off is essential
for our results. Whether or not the manager intervenes depends on the importance of
the tasks that cannot be monitored. If they are not very important, there is a signaling
equilibrium in which empowerment signals that the manager believes B to be committed.
If they are important, a manager who believes in B’s commitment always empowers,
while a manager who does not believe in B’s commitment empowers at least with some
probability (Proposition 1). The latter implies that two inefficiencies occur with positive
probability (Corollary 1): first, uncommitted workers work too little, second, committed
workers waste their effort.
In a next step, we maintain the assumption that A is known to be committed and
that the manager has perfect information, but we consider simultaneous moves of A and
B. We show that interventions then affect the image that worker A has about worker B
and that, in turn, B will behave according to this image (Corollary 2). This has no effect
on the equilibrium, if the manager has perfect information. If, however, her information
is imperfect, additional problems arise: the manager may wrongly signal that B is not
committed (Proposition 2). The consequence may be that team members’ initial trust is
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undermined and less effort is exerted (Corollary 3).
Finally, we look at a dynamic version of the model to investigate how interventions
may affect the build-up of trust in a team. Worker B may use effort as a device to signal
commitment. This, however, requires that he is sufficiently patient (Proposition 3). If
neither worker knows his co-worker’s commitment, they will only be able to use effort as a
signal and coordinate on an equilibrium in which they cooperate if their initial belief that
their co-worker is committed is particularly strong (Corollary 4). Otherwise, the negative
effect of intervention is lasting and the team takes an entirely different path compared
to the path it would have taken had the manager empowered the team. Intervention
may thus determine the culture of a team and induce seemingly selfish behavior, where
otherwise an atmosphere of trust would have emerged.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our findings
to the literature. Section 3 introduces the model, which is then analyzed in Section 4.
Section 5 reconsiders the problem in a dynamic context and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
In the tradition of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), economists have argued that teams are
crucial for modern production and that they blur individual contributions by melting
them into one joint output.1 In our model, some tasks can be monitored, while others
cannot. We then examine how the importance of the tasks that cannot be monitored
affects team governance. We hence follow the multi-task approach of Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom (1991) in assuming that some tasks are easier to observe than others and blend
this with a small body of recent literature that has more closely investigated the costs
and benefits of team work (Itoh 1991, 1992) and the organization of team work (Auriol
et al., 2002).
1Holmstro¨m (1982) has shown that introducing a principal who is the residual claimant can solve the
free-riding problem that is present in such teams.
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In terms of the informed-principal approach of the paper we are close to Be´nabou
and Tirole (2003) who show that a principal who intervenes, for instance, by providing
incentives, may reveal information to a worker, which can crowd out intrinsic motivation.
The difference is that our model considers a multi-agent situation, in which interventions
are a signal about the commitment of the other team member rather than the worker’s
own preferences.
Even closer to our paper is the one by Sliwka (2007) where actions by the principal also
inform the agent about preferences of others. There are, however, important differences.
First, Sliwka does not explicitly model the strategic interactions between agents. His
story is one in which agents may be of different types: some always stick to promises,
others never. A third undecided type adapts their preferences to the prevailing social
norm. These agents interpret an intervention by the principal as a sign that it is unusual
to stick to promises. As a result, they do not exert promised effort. This mechanism is
quite different from ours, where a worker cares about his co-worker’s preference because
it matters for team production and not because of social norms. In our model it does not
change A’s preferences, if he learns that B is not committed. Worker A simply realizes
that his effort will be wasted because B is not going to contribute, which leads him to
work less. Crowding out effort is hence present even if people do not consider social norms
but are simply interested in delivering a decent output. Secondly and potentially more
important, is that in our model hierarchical control distorts the build-up of trust in a
team, an effect that is neither present in Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), nor in the paper by
Sliwka.
Our paper adds to a large body of literature that examines the potentially detrimental
effects of explicit incentives. Such detrimental effects have been observed experimentally
(for an excellent survey see Bowles, forthcoming) as well as in field data (see the respective
survey by Frey and Jegen 2001). Seabright (2004) suggests that agents signal their type
through certain actions and can no longer use this signal once these actions are paid for.
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Alternatively, explicit incentives may be a signal themselves and inform the agent in a
principal-agent relationship about the character (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007), the
expectations (Schnedler and Vadovic 2007), or the trust of the principal (Herold 2004).2
Here, we suggest an alternative explanation for interference to have detrimental effects:
it signals the low commitment of co-workers.
We take the team and the preferences of its workers as given to study the effect of
interference on motivation. We thus abstract from the possibility that the composition
of the team and hence the preferences of its members may be influenced. This comple-
mentary question, namely, how firm policies influence the composition of the work force,
is studied by Besley and Ghatak (2005) as well as Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007).
For most economists, teams are formed to exploit technological complementarities
rather than for motivational reasons. Che and Yoo (2001) are an interesting exception.
They argue that repeated interactions and peer monitoring associated with teams simplify
the provision of incentives even in the absence of technological advantages of team produc-
tion. Ichniowski et al. (1997) provide empirical evidence that teams indeed have motiva-
tional effects. They show that team work helps steel mills to improve their productivity
independently of the used technology, and that there are important complementarities
between team work and other innovative human resource practices.
Keeping in mind these exceptions, worker motivation is regarded rather secondary for
team formation in economics. In the literature in industrial psychology, however, the idea
of multi-dimensional sources of motivation has always been accepted; the starting point
of most of the work in this field is that self-governed teams have great motivational ad-
vantages. Evidence for the positive effects of empowered and self-managed teams abound.
Kirkman and Rosen (1999) summarize a large body of literature on the benefit of self-
governed teams and present an analysis of survey data from more than 100 teams surveyed
2Herold independently developed a model that in many ways is similar to ours. However, he focuses
on interaction between the manager and a single worker rather than on the more involved team setting
and has no comparative statics with respect to the importance of the extra task.
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in four firms. They find a strong correlation between team empowerment and performance
measures.
But if self-governed teams increase efficiency, then what limits their use in firms? The
dominant explanation is that teams involve difficult governance issues. In particular,
managers find it hard to commit themselves not to intervene. There are two central
questions posed in this literature. First, what determines managerial intervention, and
second, what are the consequences of excessive intervention? Our model provides answers
to both questions and we can compare them to the empirical findings.
With respect to the first question, Kirkman and Rosen (1999) find that teams receive
more autonomy from their management when team members work on a contained prod-
uct or service, that is, if complementarities between team members are important and
contributions are difficult to identify. This finding thus meshes well with our result that
empowerment is more likely if tasks that are hard to measure are important.
Concerning the consequences of managerial intervention, Gerwin and Moffat (1997)
provide interesting evidence. They look at a sample of 14 firms and 53 teams in “concur-
rent engineering” (the parallel development of a technical innovation such as an integrated
design system for a new airplane). The authors find that withdrawing the autonomy of
concurrent engineering teams—for instance by introducing evaluation and monitoring
schemes—lowers the performance of teams measured in task performance. It also ob-
structs decision-making and reduces cohesion within the team. This finding corresponds
with our result that intervention leads to a lower provision of effort on tasks where com-
plementarities matter and to “distrust” amongst team members—in the sense that team
members believe that their colleagues are not committed.
Crozier (1964) gives a by now classical example of the effects of interventionist policies
in a public organization. In Chapter 2 of his book, he describes a highly interdependent
work organization with a strict hierarchy that comprises supervision in case of problems
and very little workplace autonomy. Crozier quotes workers: “We are obliged not to care
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about the work, although we would like to” and “Where I was before, it was sometimes
possible to be proud of one’s work, but here I do not see any possibility.” This notion is
captured in what we call the “tragedy of unempowered but committed workers” (Corol-
lary 3). Finally, workers learn very little about each other in the organization described by
Crozier. They cannot develop the “psychological safety” that is a prerequisite for learning
about each other and the success of teams (Edmondson, 1999). In terms of our dynamical
model, intervention prevents workers from learning about each others’ commitment and
jeopardizes effort exertion in later stages.
3 Model
The team and its task. We consider a team that consists of two workers, A and B. The
team is supervised by a manager and produces a value v through workers’ efforts. It is the
managers interest to maximize this value. The job of workers comprises two different types
of tasks. First, for some tasks, the manager can assure effort. The effort choice of worker
i with respect to these verifiable tasks is called eNi , where the N stands for “normal”.
We will not specify how the manager assures this effort,3 rather we are interested in how
interventions affects the interaction between team members. Second, there are tasks that
are not verifiable, and here interventions of the manager are impossible. The respective
effort will be called eEi , where the E stands for “extra”.
As an example, consider a large private or public organization that employs its own
experts in various areas and puts together a team of a programmer and a tax expert to
produce a tax software. While it is possible to check whether the tax expert has produced
a list of program functionalities or whether the software runs, the complementarities and
hence the reason for team production occurs at the interface. This part is notoriously
3The intervention could, for example, be the result of monitoring combined with an implicit un-
derstanding that the worker is fired in case of shirking. Alternatively, it may be achieved by explicit
performance pay.
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difficult to verify and depends crucially on the willingness of the team members to exert
extra effort.
For simplicity and to isolate the effect of interventions on the interactions between
workers, we suppose that the effort decision of individual i at task k are dichotomous:
eki ∈ {0, 1}, where high effort entails costs ck and the produced value is increasing in
effort. We also assume that the value of production is additive in the two tasks and
symmetric in the efforts: v = vN(eN1 , e
N
2 ) +αv
E(eE1 , e
E
2 ), where α is the importance of the
extra effort for the product. The additive structure of output and the fact that efforts
do not interact in the cost function imply that the decision to provide normal effort and
the decision to provide extra effort are technologically independent. In particular, there
is no reason for a worker to withdraw extra effort in order to increase normal effort. We
impose this structure precisely to eliminate any technological interdependence so that any
interdependency must be created by the information structure. Note that the produced
value may well be verifiable (see Appendix D) but to keep the paper tractable, we assume
that is is not.
Motivation of workers. Some of the workers are interested in the team product, which
reflects “public service mentality” or “public mindedness” for the public sector and “pro-
fessional attitude” in the private sector.4 We will call such workers committed (to the
results of production). This commitment may, for example, arise from reputational con-
cerns. However, not everybody is equally committed; some workers may not have repu-
tational concerns (or a very high discount factor). We reflect this by introducing workers
who only care about money and the disutility of effort and receive no utility from the
production result. Hence, the utility of a worker takes the form: θv− cNeNi − cEeEi . where
θ = 1 if worker i is committed and zero if he is not committed.
Effects of effort on production. The losses from extra effort are more than off-set by
4The terminology is from Francois (2000) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) who use a similar assumption.
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the increase in the value of the good:
vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0) > 2cE. (1)
Extra effort by both workers is thus a Kaldor-Hicks improvement as the manager could
compensate even two uncommitted workers for their costs and all three would be better
off. Extra effort of one worker only pays if the co-worker also puts in extra effort:
vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0) < cE and vE(0, 1)− vE(0, 0) < cE (2)
In other words, inputs on the extra task are complementary. On the other hand, the
gains from normal effort cover the respective costs—independently of the behavior of the
co-worker:
vN(·, 1)− vN(·, 0) > cN and vN(1, ·)− vN(0, ·) > cN . (3)
This means that normal efforts are not required to be complements.
Together these assumptions reflect the idea that the gains of team production are
strongest where it is most difficult to identify individual efforts. Given these assumptions,
committed workers are always willing to put in normal effort, which distinguishes them
from uncommitted workers who do not care for the value and thus do not exert effort
in the absence of incentives. In our example, a committed tax expert would take pride
in delivering a list of functionalities and a committed programmer delivers a functioning
program. However, substantial complementary gains are realized if both the programmer
and the tax expert extend their thinking beyond their field of expertise and put in the
extra effort required to do so.
As pointed out before the manager’s intervention (or “interference”) is modeled in a
reduced form. The manager is left with the choice to interfere or to “empower” the team.
If the manager interferes he can obtain eN = 1 at a price of k by some mechanism, for
instance by monitoring or incentives. The manager will never interfere when the costs of
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interference are too high. To make things interesting, costs must be sufficiently small for
interference to improve efficiency:
vN(1, ·)− vN(0, ·) > k and vN(·, 1)− vN(·, 0) > k. (4)
Information. Worker A is not sure whether worker B is committed. The manager has
some independent information about the commitment of worker B. It is not important
that the manager has better information. For instance, in our tax software example, the
team of the programmer and the tax expert is created for a specific purpose. They may
both be long-term employees of the organization and may have been members of different
working groups before. The records of these earlier activities give the manager some idea
about their commitment, information that is inaccessible to the workers who may have
other sources (for example conversations with colleagues). The manager cannot credibly
convey her information, which gives rise to the signaling problem that we are interested
in.
In most of the article, we look at the situation where only the commitment of worker B
is in question and the probability of B to be committed is common knowledge. Worker A
is always committed and this is assumed to be common knowledge, too. This assumption
is a simplification; in reality the preferences of worker A are likely to be unknown as well.
By having only one informational asymmetry, the model becomes more tractable. We
briefly discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption at the end of the analysis.
We will vary the quality of the manager’s information. Formally, we suppose that
there is a common a-priori probability λ that B is committed. In order to model the
independent information of the manager, we assume that she receives a signal θ about
the type of worker B which is correct with probability pP . The manager then uses this
signal to update her beliefs:
λP =
 λ¯P :=
λpP
pPλ+(1−pP )(1−λ) if signal indicates θ = 1,
λP := 1− (1−λ)pP
pP (1−λ)+(1−pP )λ if signal indicates θ = 0.
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Depending on the received information, we distinguish two types of managers: those with
weak beliefs λP that worker B is committed and those with strong beliefs λ
P
.
Timing.
1. Nature determines the commitment of worker B.
2. The manager receives information about this commitment.
3. The manager decides whether to interfere.
4. Workers decide about effort provision for the two tasks.
5. Payoffs accrue.
Concluding the model description, we want to summarize the essential assumptions.
First, we are looking at a production process in which the efforts for some of the tasks
can be controlled while the efforts of other tasks cannot be controlled. There are comple-
mentarities between the efforts of different team members and these complementarities
are stronger for the task that cannot be monitored. Secondly, team members may differ
in their commitment for the result of their work. Third, the manager has some pieces of
information about the commitment of some team member to which other team members
have no access to. Fourth, the manager can choose whether or not to intervene with the
team. We will use the word empowerment in the latter case. The manager’s decisions
will be guided by the benefits and costs of the intervention.
Equilibrium concept. Throughout the text, we consider Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
libria that we refine in two ways. First, there may be multiple equilibria in the subgame
in which workers decide on extra effort; we restrict attention to those equilibria in this
subgame in which committed workers exert extra effort whenever they exist. In other
words, we assume that workers co-ordinate on Pareto-optimal behavior when this is an
equilibrium in the extra effort subgame. Second, we require beliefs to fulfill the intuitive
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criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987). We refer to the equilibrium concept as pareto-refined
equilibrium (PR equilibrium).
Notice that the first refinement ensures that committed workers sometimes exert extra
effort and renders the analysis interesting; if workers would co-ordinate not to exert extra
effort, the manager’s decision to empower is trivial as it only depends on the direct costs
and benefits of the intervention on normal effort.
4 Analysis
We begin the analysis with some observations about the effort of committed and un-
committed workers. Given our assumptions it is obvious that an uncommitted worker
only exerts effort if he is forced to by the intervention of the manager. The behavior of
committed workers is described in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 (Best response of a committed worker). (i) A committed worker always exerts
normal effort. (ii) Extra effort: a committed worker’s best response is extra effort if and
only if the probability that the other worker also exerts extra effort is sufficiently large.
Proof. Claim (i) follows directly from (3). Claim (ii), if-part: recall that extra effort
pays by Equation (1): vE(1, 1)−vE(0, 0) > 2cE. This is equivalent to vE(1, 1)−vE(1, 0)+
vE(0, 1)−vE(0, 0) > 2cE or vE(1, 1)−vE(1, 0) > cE+(cE−(vE(0, 1)−vE(0, 0))) and because
of (2), we get vE(1, 1) − vE(1, 0) > cE and it is optimal for a committed workers to put
in effort. If the probability is sufficiently large, Equation (1) still dominates the behavior
of the committed worker. Claim (ii), only-if part: for a small probability, Equation (2)
dominates the behavior and the committed worker does not exert extra effort.
In other words, in equilibrium, a committed worker exerts extra effort whenever his col-
league does so.
Consider now a benchmark in which by intervening the manager can assure both
normal and extra effort. A committed worker can then count on his colleague spending
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extra effort; likewise he will exert effort by the preceding lemma. This leads to a utility of
vE(1, 1)− cE, for the committed worker. In the absence of the intervention, worker B will
have a payoff of either vE(1, 1)−cE or vE(0, 0). All other effort combinations can be ruled
out because committed workers match extra effort by Lemma 1. By an argument similar
to the one used in the proof of that lemma, it can be shown that vE(1, 1)− cE > vE(0, 0).
Hence, the committed worker is weakly better off when his colleague is controlled.
Thus, managerial interventions increase the voluntary supply of effort by a committed
worker. Committed workers welcome hierarchical control because it ensures that their
effort is not wasted. So, perfect interference works as a guarantee for effort provision;
directly on uncommitted workers and indirectly on committed ones. As this perfect
control is not very realistic, we assume for the remainder of the paper that the manager
can assure only normal effort but not extra effort.
4.1 Interference as a signal about co-worker’s type
In order to investigate the potential cost of intervention, we consider first a simple setting
in which the manager knows the type of worker B, i.e. pP = 1, the committed worker A
chooses his effort first, B observes this choice and then decides about his own effort.
As the next lemma shows, worker A’s beliefs about B, λA, play a crucial rule.
Lemma 2. If worker B can observe the extra effort of worker A before deciding on his
extra effort, there is some threshold such that worker A exerts extra effort if and only if
his belief is above this threshold:
λE =
cE − (vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0))
vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0)− (vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0)) . (5)
Proof. If worker A exerts no extra effort, worker B (who observes this choice) will not exert
extra effort—either because he is uncommitted or because of Lemma 1. Hence, the value
from extra effort becomes vE(0, 0) in this case. If worker A exerts extra effort, the response
by B depends on his type. Thus worker A’s extra effort depends on his belief about
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worker B. With probability λA, B is a committed worker, who exerts effort by Lemma 1
and with probability (1−λA) an uncommitted one, who exerts no effort. Accordingly, the
payoff is: λAvE(1, 1)+(1−λA)vE(1, 0)−cE. Comparing the two payoffs, we get that the first
worker exerts effort if and only if λAvE(1, 1)+(1−λA)vE(1, 0)−cE ≥ vE(0, 0). Solving for
λA yields the threshold λE; this threshold lies between zero and one because denominator
and numerator are positive and the denominator is smaller than the numerator.
Having established how A’s effort choice depends on his beliefs about B, we now turn to
the manager’s intervention, which occurs before the effort choice of worker A.
Three elements determine the intervention decision of the manager: (i) the direct costs
of interference k, (ii) the direct gains of interference in terms of normal effort, and (iii) the
indirect effect of signaling on extra effort.
We have not yet shown that the third effect exists, and how exactly it plays out is
stated in Proposition 1. Lemma 2 shows that the extra effort of a committed worker A
depends on his beliefs. These beliefs, however, are influenced by the manager’s action
that conveys to worker A some information about the manager’s beliefs about worker B.
Consequently, worker A updates his belief about B: if the updated belief is then below
the level defined by Lemma 2, he exerts no extra effort, otherwise he does.
This effect of signaling on extra effort is the same for managers with weak and strong
beliefs. The same is true for the direct cost of intervention. However, managers with
weak beliefs have higher direct gains from interference as they believe that B will not
exert normal effort. The last point establishes that there cannot be ”inverted signaling”
in which a manager with strong beliefs would intervene while a manager with weak beliefs
would not (this is formally shown in Lemma 7 in the Appendix).
Whether or not a manager wants to intervene depends on the importance of extra
effort and her beliefs. We define the following bound on the importance of the extra task
α in dependence of the belief λ.
α(λ) :=
(1− λ)(vN(1, 1)− vN(1, 0))− k
λ(vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0)) + (1− λ)(vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0)) . (6)
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Using this definition, we can formalize the link between the importance of the extra
task and the behavior of managers with different information (the respective proof is in
Appendix B).
Proposition 1. If worker B can observe the extra effort of worker A before deciding on
his extra effort and the manager knows the type of worker B (pP = 1), then there is a
unique PR-equilibrium and the following holds.
1. Managers with strong beliefs always empower.
2. The behavior of managers with weak beliefs depends on the importance of the extra
task:
(a) If the extra task is not important, α < α(0), a manager with weak beliefs
interferes (separating equilibrium).
(b) If the extra task is important, α > α(0), the behavior depends on the initial
beliefs of workers.
i. If worker A has sufficiently weak initial beliefs about B being committed
(λ < λE), a manager with weak beliefs empowers the team with some
probability (partially separating equilibrium).
ii. If worker A has strong initial beliefs about worker B being committed,
(λ > λE) a manager with weak belief empowers the team regardless of
her information (pooling equilibrium).
The central message of this proposition, namely, how the manager responds to the im-
portance of extra effort, is summarized in Figure 1. Observe that managers with weak
beliefs under some circumstances empower. This leads to the following inefficiency.
Corollary 1 (Behavior of workers). If worker B can observe the extra effort of worker A
before deciding on his extra effort and the manager knows the type of worker B (pP = 1),
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If the importance of the extra task is large, α > α(0), then managers with weak beliefs
empower (at least with some probability) the following inefficiencies arise: 5
1. worker B exerts no normal effort and
2. worker A wastes extra effort.
Summarizing this section, we find that worker A can learn about the worker B’s type
from the interference of the manager. The manager may then rationally respond by not
interfering if the value of extra effort is high enough and the beliefs of workers about their
colleagues are sufficiently strong.
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Figure 1: Effect of extra effort on equilibrium behavior of manager
4.2 Interference as a signal about one’s image
For the sake of clarity about the fundamental effects, we have assumed above that worker B
observes the effort of worker A before deciding. We now relax this assumption: both
workers simultaneously decide on effort. For the moment, we maintain the assumption
5More formally, there is a Hicks-Kaldor improvement: if worker B exerts normal as well as extra effort
and is reimbursed by the manager, then everybody is better off.
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that the manager is perfectly informed (pP = 1) and that it is common knowledge that
worker A is committed. In this setting, we derive the following analogue to Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. If worker A and B simultaneously decide on effort, committed workers ex-
ert effort if and only if A’s belief that B is committed is above the threshold λE from
equation (5).
Proof. A committed worker exerts extra effort if and only if λvE(1, e)) + (1−λ)vE(1, 0)−
cE ≥ λvE(0, e)+(1−λ)vE(0, 0), where e is the behavior of another committed worker. This
is equivalent to λ ≥ cE−(vE(1,0)−vE(0,0))
vE(1,e)−vE(0,e)−(vE(1,0)−vE(0,0)) . Suppose e = 1. If in addition λ ≥ λE,
the worker has an incentive to exert extra effort. Extra effort is thus an equilibrium for
λ ≥ λE. Notice that exerting no effort when the other worker exerts no effort e = 0 is
also a Nash equilibrium. This second Nash equilibrium, however, is pareto-dominated
and hence ruled out by our equilibrium notion. If the condition is not met and λ < λE,
worker A exerts no extra effort and the other worker had no reason to choose e = 1 in
the first place. Thus, given that λ < λE, extra effort is not an equilibrium.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Under the assumption that the manager is perfectly informed and with
simultaneous effort choice, equilibrium behavior of the manager is the same as described
in Proposition 1.
The corollary is proven exactly like Proposition 1 with the exception that Lemma 3 takes
the role of Lemma 2 in the respective proof. The only difference between this corollary
and the preceding proposition is the following. Before, only worker A drew inferences
from the behavior of the manager and worker B decided on the basis of the observed
effort of worker A. Now, worker B also draws inferences from the manager’s action. If
worker B finds that the manager interferes with him, he correctly infers that his co-worker
will not trust him and hence his extra effort would be wasted. Whereas before worker A
only withdrew extra effort when the manager interfered with his co-worker, worker B is
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now withdrawing effort when the manager interferes with him. Interference works like a
self-fulfilling prophecy and a committed worker with a bad image behaves in accordance
with this image. In other words, worker B acts to confirm the beliefs of worker A. For
the moment, this effect does not have any negative consequences because in equilibrium
the manager never interferes with a committed worker B. If, however, the manager is
imperfectly informed, an interesting dilemma arises—as we will see in the next section.
4.3 Un-empowered but committed workers
We now assume that the manager is imperfectly but still relatively well informed about
B’s preference, i.e., pP < 1 with pP relatively large.6 We maintain the assumption that
A is committed and that this is common knowledge.
As the manager is no longer certain about the preferences of worker B, even a manager
with strong beliefs finds it expedient to interfere if the extra task produces relatively little
value. This idea is formalized in the following analogue to Proposition 1 (the proof is in
Appendix C.2).
Proposition 2. If worker A and B simultaneously decide on effort and the manager is
well-informed (pP close to one),7 then there is a unique PR-equilibrium and the following
holds.
1. Managers with strong beliefs empower if the extra task is somewhat important (α >
α(λ¯P )).
2. The behavior of managers with weak beliefs depends on the importance of the extra
task:
6Most results of this section are robust even if the manager is not very well informed, i.e. pP is
small. Even little knowledge of the manager may be helpful to workers (see Lemma 24 in the appendix).
Moreover, the behavior described in the central proposition of this section, Proposition 2, still occurs in
equilibrium (see Appendix C.3). However, the equilibrium is no longer unique.
7A respective threshold for pP is given in Appendix C.2.
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(a) If the extra task is not too important, α < α(λP ), a manager with weak beliefs
interferes.
(b) If the extra task is important, α > α(λP ), the behavior depends on the initial
beliefs of workers.
i. If worker A has sufficiently weak initial beliefs about B being committed,
λ < λE, a manager with weak beliefs empowers the team with some proba-
bility.
ii. If worker A has strong initial beliefs about worker B being committed,
λ > λE, a manager with weak beliefs empowers the team regardless of
her information.
Compared to Proposition 1, there are two additional inefficiencies which arise when the
manager is imperfectly but well informed. First, since the manager with strong beliefs is
no longer empowering if extra effort is of low importance (α < α(λ¯P )), the information of
the manager is no longer revealed to worker A. Accordingly, worker A may never learn that
his co-worker is committed. Then, committed workers, who otherwise would have exerted
extra effort, refrain from doing so. Second, as the manager is not perfectly informed, she
will occasionally interfere although worker B is committed.
Corollary 3 (Tragedy of un-empowered but committed workers). For very low and very
high importance of the extra task, i.e., α > α(λP ) or α < α(λ
P
), the manager interferes
with some probability with a committed worker B and hence (weakly) reduces the supply
of extra effort by committed workers.
Previously, all inefficiencies where due to uncommitted workers who did not exert effort
or committed workers who exerted too much effort. This corollary shows that committed
workers may exert less effort as a result of interference.
An un-empowered and committed worker B is, of course, painfully aware of the fact
that he and his team mate are committed and that they could both improve their situation
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by exerting extra effort. This improvement could be achieved if worker B tells worker A
that he is committed. However, such communication may not be credible because an
uncommitted worker may have an interest to appear as committed when he stands to gain
from the extra effort of a colleague. Appendix D provides an example for such a situation.
it is not credible if worker B claims to be committed. This leaves the question whether
there is a channel for worker B to credibly convince worker A that he is committed. In
the next section, we introduce such a channel.
5 Dynamic considerations
Even if workers work separately on a team project, they often observe the behavior of
their co-workers later. If the team remains together, future effort decisions can be made
contingent on the observed earlier effort. A committed worker who wants to convince his
co-worker of his character may choose to exert effort for this reason. As in the preceding
section, we assume that the manager is sufficiently informed and that workers decide on
effort simultaneously. In contrast this section, we suppose now that after effort is exerted
by both workers, the effort choices are revealed and the team meets again for a second
round of effort exertion. We then study how repetition and the possibility to signal one’s
type by effort affects the behavior of committed workers. In order to simplify matters,
the manager only decides on empowerment in the first round while interference is effective
and costs k in both rounds. The value of payoffs from the second round are discounted
with a common discount factor of δ. The repeated nature evokes the idea that effort may
be sustained using peer pressure, for example, in a self-enforcing equilibrium. But even
in an infinitely repeated game, an uncommitted worker cannot be forced to exert effort:
“no effort” is a strictly dominant strategy irrespective of the future effort choices of the
colleagues precisely because the uncommitted worker does not care about output. With
two committed workers, the issue at hand is not an enforcement but rather an information
problem. It is this information problem that we are addressing in this section. First, we
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deal with a situation where worker A is committed and this is common knowledge. Then,
we move on to a case where the preferences of worker A are not known.
5.1 Extra effort as a trust-building measure
In this section, we assume that worker A is known to be committed. A committed
worker B can then exert extra effort to convince worker A that it is worth putting in
extra effort in the second round. To understand the consequences, we examine the belief
λA2 of worker A at the beginning of the second round, i.e., before exerting effort for a
second time.
Lemma 4. Worker A’s belief to face a committed worker B, λA2 , increases in unsolicited
effort of worker B.
Proof. Assume that there is an equilibrium in which worker A’s belief stays the same
or decreases when observing unsolicited extra effort. An uncommitted worker receives a
lower payoff under all possible actions that may follow extra effort than when he sticks
to no extra effort. By evoking the intuitive criterion, worker A thus believes to face
a committed worker if he sees unsolicited extra effort (off the equilibrium path) which
contradicts the assumption that worker A’s belief does not increase.
This lemma ensures that unsolicited effort can be employed as a signal. In principle, there
are two ways to exert unsolicited effort: normal effort if the manager has not interfered
and extra effort if the manager has interfered. The former is completely costless for a
committed worker. Accordingly, the worker is always going to use this signal. However,
normal effort can only be used as a signal when the manager does not interfere with the
worker. But then, there is no need for worker B to signal his type. Signaling the type only
has value if the manager interfered, created an inefficiency, and a committed worker B
tries to eliminate this inefficiency. The following proposition deals with this problem.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that workers remain together for two rounds, decide simultane-
ously on extra effort in each round, and the effort exerted in the first round is observed
before entering the second round. Consider a situation in which the manager has interfered
with worker B in the first round and worker A does not believe worker B to be committed
before extra effort is exerted in this round. Then, worker B will exert extra effort in the
first round to signal commitment if and only if he is sufficiently patient (δ > δ∗).
Proof. Because the manager has interfered, worker B can only signal that he is committed
by using extra effort. If worker B exerts no extra effort in the first round, worker A has
no reason to update his beliefs (λA2 < λ
E) and will not exert extra effort in the second
round either. In the last round, worker B has thus no incentive to exert extra effort.
Hence, payoffs in the second round when worker B exerts no extra effort in the first round
will be vE(0, 0) + δvE(0, 0). If worker B exerts extra effort in the first round, worker A
believes that B is committed by Lemma 4. Accordingly, extra effort will be exerted by
both in the second round. Note that worker A never exerts extra effort in the first round,
because his beliefs are weak. The payoff to worker B from extra effort in the first round
is thus: vE(0, 1) − cE + δ(vE(1, 1) − cE). Summarizing, worker B exerts extra effort in
the first round whenever vE(0, 1) − cE + δ(vE(1, 1) − cE) ≥ vE(0, 0) + δvE(0, 0). Solving
for δ yields: δ ≥ cE−(vE(0,1)−vE(0,0))
vE(1,1)−vE(0,0)−cE =: δ
∗, where the right-hand side is strictly positive
by Equations (1) and (2). It is also strictly below one because Equation (1) together
with the assumption that the value derived from the extra task increases in extra effort
yields: vE(1, 1) − vE(0, 1) − (vE(0, 0) − vE(0, 0)) > 2 · cE, which in turn is equivalent to
cE − (vE(0, 1)− vE(0, 0)) < vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0)− cE.
The possibility to use extra effort as a signal for one’s preference partially alleviates the
inefficiency because worker B exerts extra effort even when the manager interferes. Only
the extra effort of worker A in the first round is lost. This efficiency loss (vE(0, 1) −
vE(0, 0)− cE) is smaller than the gains of future effort exertion (vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0)− 2cE)
whenever the worker is sufficiently patient (δ > δ∗). Extra effort can thus be a trust-
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building measure which improves efficiency. It can, however, not eliminate the inefficiency
completely. The first round extra effort from worker B is not met by extra effort from
worker A and hence partially wasted.
If worker B is impatient, he will not try to signal commitment. Still, empowerment
becomes less attractive to the manager: if an empowered worker A wrongly believes B
to be committed and exerts extra effort in the first round, he will correct this mistake in
the second round. This affects the manager’s trade-off. In order to be able to capture the
new situation, we define a new benchmark for the relative importance of the extra task
when worker B is impatient:
α˜0(λ) :=
(1 + δ)[(1− λ)(vN(1, 1)− vN(1, 0))− k]
(1 + δ)[λ(vE(1, 1)− vE(0, 0))] + (1− λ)(vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0)) . (7)
If worker B is patient, empowerment becomes even less attractive to the manager: the
manager can rely on worker B to correct the negative signal of interference by exerting
extra effort. For the case of a patient worker B, we define the benchmark:
α˜1(λ) :=
(1 + δ)[(1− λ)(vN(1, 1)− vN(1, 0))− k]
λ(vE(1, 1)− vE(1, 0))] + (1− λ)(vE(1, 0)− vE(0, 0)) . (8)
Comparing the three benchmarks for a task to be considered important, we find: α(λ) <
α˜0(λ) < α˜1(λ). In words, given the same belief λ, the threshold for an extra task to be
considered important is higher when there is a second round and worker B is impatient
and even higher when worker B is patient. We can use this new benchmark to describe
the behavior of the manager in dependence of the importance of the extra task.
Corollary 4. Let the manager be sufficiently informed and suppose that workers remain
together for two rounds, decide simultaneously on extra effort in each round, and the
effort exerted in the first round is observed before entering the second round. Then, the
manager’s behavior is described by Proposition 2, where α˜0(λ) replaces α(λ). if worker B
is impatient , δ < δ∗. And, it is described by Proposition 2, where α˜1(λ) replaces α(λ). if
worker B is patient , δ > δ∗.
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Proof. Under the assumption that worker B is impatient and that interference signals
weak beliefs, the payoffs to a manager who interferes are:
(1+δ)(vN(1, 1)−k)+α(λPvE(0, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0))+δα(λPvE(0, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0)),
While the payoffs to a manager who empowers are:
(1 + δ)(λPvN(1, 1) + (1− λP )vN(1, 0)) + α(λPvE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(1, 0))
+ δα(λPvE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0)). (9)
Comparing these two payoffs yields the threshold α˜0(λ). The proof then follows from
replacing the threshold used in the proof of Proposition 2 by the new threshold.
If we compute the same payoffs if worker B is patient, the payoff from empowerment
is the same, while interference yields
(1+δ)(vN(1, 1)−k)+α(λPvE(1, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0))+δα(λPvE(1, 1)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0)).
The threshold that keeps the manager indifferent is then α˜1(λ) and the proof follows from
using this new threshold in the proof of Proposition 2.
The key insight from this proposition is that extra effort needs to be more important for
the manager to empower in the dynamic setting and even higher if worker B is patient.
The reason is that the costs of signaling drop because worker A can learn from the first
round and because worker B can correct the bad impression following interference by
exerting extra effort.
5.2 Lasting destructive effects of interference
Extra effort is a valuable signal for worker B because worker A is known to be committed.
In this section, we relax the assumption that worker A’s type is known. Instead, there is
a commonly known prior λ that this worker is committed. How does this influence the
behavior of worker B?
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Most importantly, extra effort is now only used as a signal of commitment, if worker B’s
beliefs about worker A’s commitment are sufficiently strong.
Proposition 4. If the manager interferes with a committed worker B, this worker B
exerts extra effort and signals to be committed if and only if he has sufficiently strong
beliefs λ > 2λE and is sufficiently patient δ > δ(λ) > δ∗.
Proof. Initially, the belief of worker B to face a committed worker A (now and in the next
round) is λ. If λ < λE, worker B has no reason to exert extra effort either now or in the
future and signaling his commitment is not optimal for worker B. If on the other hand,
the beliefs of worker B about worker A are sufficiently large (λ > λE), he believes that
A exerts effort in the second round and will do the same. Then, extra effort in the first
round leads to an expected payoff of vE(0, 1)− cE + δ(λvE(1, 1) + (1− λ)vE(1, 0)− cE).
Comparing this payoff with the payoff of no extra effort (vE(0, 0) + δvE(0, 0)) yields that
extra effort is efficient whenever δ > c
E+vE(0,0)−vE(1,0)
λvE(1,1)+(1−λ)vE(1,0)−vE(0,0)−cE =: δ(λ). In order for
δ(λ) to be below one, it is necessary that λ > c
E−(vE(0,1)−vE(0,0))
vE(1,1)−vE(1,0) · 2 = λE · 2.
This proposition shows that uncertainty about the type of worker A weakens the possi-
bility to overcome inefficiency by exerting extra effort. Worker B must be more patient
(δ > δ(λ) > δ∗) than when he knows that worker A is committed. Moreover, worker B
needs to have very strong beliefs that worker A is committed (λ > 2 · λE). Again, the
change in the signaling behavior will influence the empowerment decision of the man-
ager. Relative to the previous situation, the worker signals less and hence the manager
empowers more (i.e. for lower α) than before.
We focused the analysis on the empowerment of worker B. Now, as worker A’s commit-
ment is unknown and he might not be committed, it seems reasonable to also consider the
problem of interfering with this worker. The respective analysis is completely symmetric.
However, the decision to interfere is not independent for the following reason. Suppose
that the manager interferes with worker B. We have seen that under appropriate condi-
tions this implies that committed workers are not exerting extra effort. Consequently, the
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indirect costs of interference are already incurred and any decision whether to empower or
interfere with worker A only depends on the direct benefits and costs of interference. In
other words, interfering with worker A is cheaper when the manager is already interfering
with B. Managers are more inclined to interfere with worker A if they intend to interfere
with worker B.
This section has shown that the behavior of the manager can have lasting effect on
beliefs and hence on effort provision by workers. Intrinsic motivation will be “crowded
out” and even committed team members cannot re-establish an atmosphere which is
conducive to voluntary effort, again. According to Tuckman and Jensen (1977) groups
go through a number of ideal-type phases: forming - storming - norming - performing -
adjourning. The decisive phase for the success of a team is the norming phase. Here, team-
members develop common performance standards. If they do not, there is no success. In
our dynamic model, managerial interventions may have precisely that effect, because they
can distort the process through which team-members learn about the composition of the
team. Consequently, an otherwise well performing team settles on just providing the
“normal”—in the sense of monitorable— effort.
6 Concluding remarks
We have presented a first step towards an economic theory of team governance. A man-
ager, who decides whether to empower the team or to intervene, faces a simple tradeoff.
While intervening increases effort for tasks that can be monitored easily, it may distort
the effort incentives for tasks that cannot be monitored. The reason is that they affect
the beliefs of members of the team about the commitment of their team-mates to the
joint production result. It follows that the optimality of intervention vs. empowerment
depends on both prior beliefs about the commitment of team-members and the impor-
tance of tasks that cannot be monitored. In a dynamic perspective, interventions may
destroy the trusting atmosphere that is required for voluntary effort.
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Appendix
A Preliminaries
We structure the analysis according to the importance of the extra task. This importance, as
defined in equation (6), decreases in the belief of the manager.
Lemma 5. α(λ) decreases in λ.
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Proof. Note that α(λ) is the ratio (1−λ)(v
N (1,1)−vN (1,0)−k)
λ(vE(1,1)−vE(0,0))+(1−λ)(vE(1,0)−vE(0,0)) =
g(λ)
h(λ) . The sign of the
derivative is hence determined by g′(λ)h(λ) − g(λ)h′(λ). Note that h(λ), g(λ), and h′(λ) =
vE(1, 1) − vE(1, 0) are positive while g′(λ) = −(vN (1, 1) − vN (1, 0) is negative. So, overall the
derivative is negative and α(λ) decreases in λ
We can thus distinguish three cases:
• no manager finds the extra task important: α(λP ) < α,
• only managers with strong beliefs find the extra task important: α(λ¯P ) < α < α(λP ), and
• all managers find the extra task important: α(λP ) < α.
Most of the following results require that the manager’s information would affect the committed
workers if they had this information. Formally, we define the following monotonicity condition.
Definition 1 (Monotonicity condition). The monotonicity condition is met if and only if there is
a threshold λE such that committed workers exert effort if they share the belief with an manager
with strong beliefs λ¯P > λE and they do not exert effort if they share the belief with a manager
with weak beliefs λP < λE.
For several results, we need the following threshold: λˆ := 1 − k
vN (1,1)−vN (1,0) . This parameter
can be regarded as an indicator how effective the interference of the manager is, i.e. how the
direct costs of interference k relate to its direct benefit of higher normal effort.
In principle, there are three types of equilibria:
• signaling equilibria, where interference reveals the information of the manager,
• pooled empowerment, where all managers empower, and
• pooled interference, where all managers interfere.
In the following, we examine under which conditions these three types of behavior occur in
equilibrium. The notion of equilibrium used will be the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Occasionally, we appeal to the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).
A.1 Signaling in Equilibrium
This section lists conditions when to expect signaling to occur in equilibrium. We distinguish
two types of signaling.
Definition 2 (Normal and inverted signaling). Signaling is normal if and only if interference
signals that the manager has weak beliefs. Signaling is inverted if and only if interference signals
that the manager has strong beliefs.
Lemma 6. A manager with weak beliefs has a larger payoff from interfering than an manager
with strong beliefs.
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Proof. In terms of the gains from interference, a manager with strong beliefs differs from a
manager with weak beliefs only with respect to the benefits from normal effort on the first task.
Direct costs and signaling costs are identical. As the manager with strong beliefs expects higher
normal effort, the gains from control are smaller.
Lemma 7 (Interference cannot signal optimism). In equilibrium, there is no inverted signaling.
Proof. Suppose intervention signals that the manager has strong beliefs. Then, the manager with
strong beliefs prefers intervention to empowerment while managers with weak beliefs empower.
However, intervention yields higher gains to managers with weak rather than strong beliefs by
the preceding lemma and intervention is thus a profitable deviation for managers with weak
beliefs.
Lemma 8. Suppose α < α(λ¯P ). Then, there is no normal signaling in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose normal signaling is an equilibrium. Then, empowerment is used only by man-
agers with strong beliefs. Consequently, a deviation yields λ¯P vN (1, 1) + (1 − λ¯P )vN (1, 1) +
α(λ¯P vE(0, 0) + (1 − λ¯P )vE(0, 0)) − k which is larger than the equilibrium payoff λ¯P vN (1, 1) +
(1− λ¯P )vN (1, 0) + α(λ¯P vE(1, 1) + (1− λ¯P )vE(1, 0)) because α < α(λ¯P ).
Lemma 9. Suppose that α(λ¯P ) < α < α(λP ) and that the monotonicity condition holds. Then,
normal signaling occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. The equilibrium payoff to an manager with strong beliefs is λ¯P vN (1, 1)+(1−λ¯P )vN (1, 0)+
α(λ¯P vE(1, 1)+(1− λ¯P )vE(1, 0)), while deviation means that workers thinks she has weak beliefs
and don’t put in extra effort. Accordingly, the deviation yields λ¯P vN (1, 1) + (1− λ¯P )vN (1, 1) +
α(λ¯P vE(0, 0) + (1 − λ¯P )vE(0, 0)) − k, which is smaller because α(λ¯P ) < α. The equilibrium
payoff to a manager with weak beliefs is λP vN (1, 1) + (1 − λP )vN (1, 1) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1 −
λP )vE(0, 0))−k.When deviating and empowering, the manager with weak beliefs is taken to have
strong beliefs and has a payoff of λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+(1−λP )vE(1, 0)),
which is smaller because α < α(λP ).
Lemma 10. Suppose α > α(λP ) and that the monotonicity condition holds. Then, there is no
normal signaling in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose empowerment is used only by managers with strong beliefs. Then, the payoff
to a manager with weak beliefs is
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 1) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0))− k.
When deviating and empowering, the manager with weak beliefs gets λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+
α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(1, 0)). This deviation is profitable because α > α(λP ).
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A.2 Pooled Empowerment in Equilibrium
This section lists conditions when to expect pooled empowerment in equilibrium. We distinguish
three types of results: (i) general results, (ii) results which are valid if the manager is sufficiently
informed, (iii) results when the manager is badly informed.
Definition 3 (Pooled and mixed empowerment). Pooled empowerment is present if managers
with strong and weak beliefs empower. Mixed empowerment is present if the manager with strong
beliefs always empowers and the manager with weak beliefs empowers with some probability.
A.2.1 General results
Lemma 11. Suppose α < α(λP ). Then, there is no pooled empowerment in equilibrium.
Proof. If all managers empower, the equilibrium payoff to a manager with weak beliefs is at most
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 0) +α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(1, 0)). The payoff when deviating is
at least
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 1) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0))− k.
Because α < α(λP ), this deviation is profitable and empowerment by all managers cannot be
an equilibrium.
Lemma 12. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are weak (λ < λE), and the monotonicity condi-
tion holds. Then, empowerment by managers with strong beliefs and occasional empowerment by
managers with weak beliefs occurs in equilibrium. In this equilibrium, workers occasionally exert
extra effort following empowerment. Beliefs in this equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. Let β = (1−λ)(v
N (1,1)−vN (1,0))−k
α(λP vE(1,1)+(1−λP )vE(1,0)−vE(0,0)) be the probability of an observable signal that
committed workers use as a prompt for exerting effort after empowerment. Note that this
probability lies strictly between zero and one because α(λP ) < α. Then managers with weak
beliefs are indifferent between empowering and not empowering while managers with strong
beliefs have a clear preference for empowering. At the same time, the probability with which a
manager with weak beliefs empowers can be such that committed workers are indifferent between
exerting extra effort and not exerting extra effort after empowerment. Following interference,
they do not exert extra effort.
A.2.2 Sufficiently informed manager
Lemma 13. Suppose initial beliefs are weak(λ < λE) and the manager is sufficiently informed
(λP < λˆ < λ¯P ). Then, there is no pooled empowerment in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose empowerment by all managers is an equilibrium and λ < λE . Then, managers
with weak beliefs earn λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 0) +α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1−λP )vE(0, 0)) while a
deviation is more profitable: λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 1) +α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1−λP )vE(0, 0))−
k.
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Lemma 14. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE), the manager is sufficiently
informed (λP < λˆ < λ¯P ), and the monotonicity condition is met. Then, pooled empowerment
occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. In equilibrium, managers earn
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 0) + α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(1, 0)).
A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 1)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+(1−λP )vE(1, 0))−k,
which is not enough to entice a manager with strong beliefs since λˆ < λP . Consequently,
the intuitive criterion requires that a deviating manager is taken to have weak beliefs and
workers respond by exerting no extra effort. Thus the deviation actually yields λP vN (1, 1) +
(1− λP )vN (1, 1) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0))− k, which is not enough as the extra task
is sufficiently important: α(λP ) < α.
A.2.3 Badly informed manager
Lemma 15. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE) and λP > λˆ, and the
monotonicity condition holds. Then, pooled empowerment occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this
equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. In equilibrium, managers earn
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 0) + α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1− λP )vE(1, 0)).
A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 1)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+(1−λP )vE(1, 0))−k,
which is not enough to entice the manager with weak beliefs, let alone the managers with strong
beliefs because λP > λˆ and λ¯P > λˆ.
Lemma 16. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE), λ¯P < λˆ and the mono-
tonicity condition is met. Then, pooled empowerment occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this
equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. Suppose such an equilibrium exists and that workers belief that a manager who deviates
has weak beliefs. Then, managers earn λP vN (1, 1) + (1 − λP )vN (1, 0) + α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1 −
λP )vE(1, 0)). A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 1) +α(λP vE(1, 0) + (1−
λP )vE(1, 0))− k, which would be enough to entice both types of managers. So, the belief that
managers who deviate have weak beliefs does not fail the intuitive criterion. Given these beliefs,
deviation actually yields λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 1) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0))− k,
which is neither enough for managers with weak nor with strong beliefs.
Summarizing the lemmata on empowering, empowering can only arise as an equilibrium if
the extra task is sufficiently important α > α(λP ) and initial beliefs are strong.
A.3 Pooled Interference in Equilibrium
This section presents several conditions under which pooled interference can arise in equilib-
rium. Again, we distinguish general results, results for sufficiently informed and badly informed
managers.
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A.3.1 General results
Lemma 17. Suppose α < α(λ¯P ). Then, pooled interference occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in
this equilibrium satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. The payoff in equilibrium to a manager with strong beliefs is at least
λ¯P vN (1, 1) + (1− λ¯P )vN (1, 1) + α(λ¯P vE(0, 0) + (1− λ¯P )vE(0, 0))− k,
while deviation maximally yields λ¯P vN (1, 1)+(1−λ¯P )vN (1, 0)+α(λ¯P vE(1, 1)+(1−λ¯P )vE(1, 0)).
The latter is smaller because α < α(λ¯P ). The manager with weak beliefs has an even lower gain
of deviating and will hence also stick with interference.
Lemma 18. Suppose α(λ¯P ) < α < α(λP ), initial beliefs are weak (λ < λE), the monotonicity
condition holds and beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion. Then, pooled interference cannot occur
in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose interference would be an equilibrium. Then, the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1)+
(1−λP )vN (1, 1)+α(λP vE(0, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0))−k. A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+
(1 − λP )vN (1, 0) + α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1 − λP )vE(1, 0)), which is only enough to entice managers
with strong beliefs. So, workers will conclude that the deviation comes from an manager with
strong beliefs and the payoff of the deviation attains the maximum and is hence profitable.
A.3.2 Sufficiently informed manager
Lemma 19. Suppose α(λ¯P ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE), the manager is sufficiently
informed (λP < λˆ < λ¯P ), the monotonicity condition holds, and beliefs satisfy the intuitive
criterion. Then, pooled interference does not occur in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose interference would be an equilibrium. Then, the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1)+
(1−λP )vN (1, 1)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+(1−λP )vE(1, 0))−k. A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+
(1−λP )vN (1, 0) +α(λP vE(1, 1) + (1−λP )vE(1, 0)), which is just enough to entice the manager
with strong beliefs because λP < λˆ < λ¯P . The worker concludes that the deviating manager has
strong beliefs and exerts extra effort, so that the deviation is profitable.
Lemma 20. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are weak (λ < λE), the manager is sufficiently
informed λˆ < λ¯P , and the monotonicity condition holds. Then, pooled interference does not
occur in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose pooled interference is an equilibrium. Then the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1)+
(1−λP )vN (1, 1)+α(λP vE(0, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0))−k. A deviation yields at least λP vN (1, 1)+
(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+α(λP vE(0, 0)+(1−λP )vE(0, 0)), which is profitable to a manager with strong
beliefs because λ¯P > λˆ.
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A.3.3 Badly informed manager
Lemma 21. Suppose α(λ¯P ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE), λ¯P < λˆ, and the monotonic-
ity condition holds. Then, pooled interference occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this equilibrium
satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Proof. In equilibrium, the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 1) +α(λP vE(1, 1) +
(1−λP )vE(1, 0))−k. A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+
(1− λP )vE(1, 0)), which is not enough to entice even the manager with strong beliefs.
Lemma 22. Suppose α(λ¯P ) < α, initial beliefs are strong (λ > λE), λˆ < λP , costs k are
sufficiently small, and the monotonicity condition holds. Then, pooled interference occurs in
equilibrium. Beliefs in this equilibrium do not satisfy the intuitive criterion. If beliefs are required
to satisfy the intuitive criterion, pooled interference cannot occur in equilibrium.
Proof. In equilibrium, the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 1) +α(λP vE(1, 1) +
(1−λP )vE(1, 0))−k. A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+
(1−λP )vE(1, 0)), which is enough to entice the managers with weak or strong beliefs. The worker
may conclude that the deviating manager has weak beliefs and not exert extra effort. This belief
of the worker does not satisfy the intuitive criterion since managers with strong beliefs too would
be enticed by the maximal payoff following deviation. Given this belief, the deviation yields
λP vN (1, 1) + (1− λP )vN (1, 0) +α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1− λP )vE(0, 0)). This deviation is profitable if
and only if (1−λP )(vN (1, 1)−vN (1, 0))+λP (vE(1, 1)−vE(1, 0))+(1−λP )(vE(1, 0)−vE(0, 0)) < k,
which is wrong if k is sufficiently small.
If beliefs are required to fulfill the intuitive criterion, workers’ beliefs after seeing empower-
ment must be at least equal to their initial strong beliefs. Accordingly, they will exert effort.
But this means that there is a profitable deviation.
Lemma 23. Suppose α(λP ) < α, initial beliefs are weak (λ < λE), λ¯P ≤ λˆ, and the monotonicity
condition holds. Then, pooled interference occurs in equilibrium. Beliefs in this equilibrium
satisfy the intuitive criterion but the equilibrium is pareto-dominated.
Proof. In equilibrium, the payoff to managers is λP vN (1, 1) + (1−λP )vN (1, 1) +α(λP vE(0, 0) +
(1−λP )vE(0, 0))−k. A deviation maximally yields λP vN (1, 1)+(1−λP )vN (1, 0)+α(λP vE(1, 1)+
(1−λP )vE(1, 0)), which is enough to entice managers with weak and strong beliefs. The worker
may not update their beliefs when seeing a deviation. Given these beliefs, the deviation yields
λP vN (1, 1) + (1 − λP )vN (1, 0) + α(λP vE(0, 0) + (1 − λP )vE(0, 0)). The deviation is not even
profitable for an manager with strong beliefs since λ¯P ≤ λˆ.
If the extra task is important α(λP ) < α and initial beliefs are weak (λ < λE), there
is also a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which managers with strong beliefs empower
and with weak beliefs occasionally empower by Lemma 23. In this equilibrium, the payoff for
managers with weak beliefs is the same. Managers with strong beliefs and committed workers
are strictly better off because extra effort is exerted occasionally. Uncommitted workers are
better off because they can slack on normal effort. The equilibrium described above is hence
pareto-dominated.
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B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 distinguishes four cases: the importance of the extra task can be low (α < α(0))
or high (α > α(0)) and workers can be strong (λ > λE) or weak (λ < λE). To prove existence
and uniqueness in these cases, we heavily draw on the preceding lemmata. When applying the
lemmata, it is important to note that λ¯P = 1 so that α(λ¯P ) = α(1) = 0 by equation (6) and
λ¯P = 1 > λˆ, while λP = 0 < λˆ. Moreover, the monotonicity condition is always met because of
Lemma 2.
B.1 Extra task not important to managers with strong beliefs:
α < α(0)
By Lemma 9, there is a separating equilibrium where interference signals weak beliefs and by
Lemma 7, there is no equilibrium where interference signals optimism. Next, we want to ensure
that there are no pooling equilibria. By Lemma 11, a pooling equilibrium where both empower
does not exist. It remains to be shown that there is no pooling equilibrium where both interfere.
This is where we need to evoke the intuitive criterion. First, consider the case of workers
with weak beliefs (λ < λE). Then, there is no pooling equilibrium, where both interfere by
Lemma 18. In the case of workers with strong beliefs (λ > λE) pooled interference can be ruled
out by Lemma 19.
B.2 Extra task important to managers with weak beliefs:
α(0) < α
In this case, it is expedient to distinguish between the sub-cases where workers have weak and
strong initial beliefs.
B.2.1 Workers with strong initial beliefs
By Lemma 14, pooled empowerment occurs in equilibrium. By Lemma 7, there is no equilibrium,
where interference signals strong beliefs of the manager. By Lemma 10, there is no equilibrium,
where interference signals weak beliefs of the manager. It remains to be shown that there is no
pooling equilibrium, where all managers interfere; this follows from Lemma 19, where we have
to rely on the intuitive criterion again.
B.2.2 Workers with weak initial beliefs
By Lemma 12, there exists an equilibrium, where managers with strong beliefs always empower
and managers with weak beliefs only empower occasionally. By Lemma 7, there is no equilibrium,
where interference signals strong beliefs of the manager. By Lemma 10, there is no equilibrium,
where interference signals weak beliefs of the manager. By Lemma 13 pooled empowerment is
no equilibrium and by Lemma 20 pooled interference is not an equilibrium.
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C Imperfectly informed manager
When the manager is imperfectly informed, the information may not be useful to the workers.
This implies that the monotonicity condition may not be fulfilled.
C.1 When is the manager’s information useful?
As guaranteed by Lemma 3, committed workers will exert effort if and only their belief is above
λE . The manager, who is now imperfectly informed, can only influence the worker’s decision if
the information matters to the worker. This is the case if and only if λ¯P > λE > λP . Note that
λ¯P and λP are increasing continuous functions of the initial belief λ which approach one as λ
approaches one and zero as λ approaches zero. In addition, λ¯P > λP . This immediately leads
to the following lemma.
Lemma 24. There is always some initial belief for which the information of the manager matters
for the worker. Given this belief the monotonicity condition is met.
Because the monotonicity condition is met at least for some initial belief, we can again draw
on the various lemmata to derive the behavior in equilibrium for this case.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In contrast to Proposition 1, the manager is only almost perfectly informed: p is near but not
necessary equal to one. Accordingly, λ¯P is near one and λP near zero. More importantly, α(λ¯P )
is no longer zero. This means, we have an additional case to examine: α < α(λ¯P ).
Let us formally define a threshold on the precision of the manager such that the mono-
tonicity condition is fulfilled and the manager is sufficiently informed pˆ := supp{λ¯P (p) > λE >
λP (p) and λ¯P (p) > λˆ > λP (p)}. We say, the manager is sufficiently informed if pP > p.
The case that the extra task is important to all managers (α(λP ) < α) can be proven anal-
ogously to the case α(0) < α in Proposition 1. There are only lemmata used in this case that
are not general: Lemma 13 and Lemma 19. However, both hold if the manager is sufficiently
informed.
The case that the extra task is only important to managers with strong beliefs: (α(λ¯P ) < α <
α(λP )) can be proven analogously to the case α < α(0) in Proposition 1. Again Lemma 19 is the
only result where precision matters and which requires that the manager is sufficiently informed.
The new case, which did not exist in Proposition 1 is the case α < α(λ¯P ). In this case, there
is an equilibrium with pooled interference by Lemma 17. The equilibrium is unique because
there is no inverted signaling due to Lemma 7, no normal signaling because of Lemma 8, and no
pooled empowerment because of Lemma 14 (where the last result relies again on a sufficiently
informed manager).
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C.3 Robustness when the manager is badly informed
If the manager is badly informed, there are a few new sub-cases and there are new equilibrium
candidates in known cases.
Two new cases occur if the extra task is very important, α(λP ) < α, and beliefs are strong.
As before when α(λP ) < α, pooled empowerment is an equilibrium (Lemma 15 and Lemma 16).
Another case occurs if the extra task is important, α(λ¯P ) < α, beliefs are strong, and interference
is effective, λ¯P < λˆ. In this new situation, interference occurs in equilibrium (Lemma 21).
The examined three cases describe the behavior in situations that did not occur before.
There are also situations, which we have considered before, and in which new Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria are possible, now. These equilibria, however, fail either the intuitive criterion
(Lemma 22) or are Pareto-dominated (Lemma 23). Accordingly, they do not fall into the class
of equilibria, which we are considering in this article.
D Contractible output example
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that team output is not contractible and that
workers cannot credibly communicate to co-workers that they are committed. Also, we have
used a reduced form to model the interference of the manager. This section presents a simple
example which addresses these three issues and shows that our main results do not conflict with
these assumptions.
Suppose that effort costs are cN < 1 < 1.5 < cE < 2 and assume the following value
production functions: vN (e) = eN1 + e
N
2 , v
E(e) = eE1 + e
E
2 + e
E
1 · eE2 such that the overall
value of team production is v = vN + vE . Hence, there are six outcomes of team production
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Reflecting the idea that extra effort cannot be ensured, we assume that a court
can easily distinguish whether no (v = 0), some (v = 1) or a substantial (v > 1) team output
has been achieved. The finer details with respect to the team output cannot be verified.
In order to motivate an uncommitted worker, the manager has to pay a bonus. As worker A
is always exerting at least normal effort, the bonus has to be paid for substantial effort. If
the bonus exceeds one and the committed worker A exerts no extra effort, the uncommitted
worker B has an incentive to exert normal effort. If A exerts extra effort, the team output is
already substantial, the uncommitted worker B pockets the bonus independent from his behavior
and has hence no reason to exert any effort. It is impossible to entice an uncommitted worker B
to exert extra effort: B can obtain the bonus cheaper by exerting normal rather than extra
effort.
Observe that an uncommitted worker B, who has not been empowered by the manager, i.e.,
who has been promised a bonus when substantial output is achieved, has all reason to convince
the committed worker A to engage in extra effort. If an uncommitted B manages to convince
worker A that he is committed, A may exert extra effort, which allows B to slack.
Summarizing, (partially) contractible team output is not conflicting with our reduced form
assumption that only normal effort can be enforced. Moreover, a bonus based on team output
provides an explanation why it is difficult for the committed worker B to credibly communicate
that he is committed.
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